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Abstract
This paper analyzes the provision of goods with consumption externalities (such
as public policies) in hybrid settings: the `good' is provided in a democratic
process by majority vote, but each individual agent is free to contribute addi-
tional amounts before or after the political decision has been made. Prominent
examples include policy making in federal states, charities, and dual provision of
health care. We show that regardless of the timing of private and public actions,
the results of the median voter theorem apply. A move from a purely public
system to a dual system with private ex-ante contributions is shown to be unam-
biguously preferred by everybody in society. In contrast, establishing an ex-post
contribution regime may be opposed by a minority of high-preference individuals.
The paper also derives results for a scenario with endogenous timing of private
contributions. Most importantly, this general regime is shown to be majority
preferred not only to the systems with ex-post and the ex-ante contributions,
but also to an institutional setting with private but no public provision.
JEL Classi¯cation: D02, D78, H11, H40, P16.
Keywords: Public goods, Majority voting, private provision, dual provision, federalism,
charities, health care.
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Democratic policy decisions are often supplemented by private actions. Charities step
in where, in the view of the donors, tax dollars do not guarantee a su±cient scale of
services. In countries with a tax-¯nanced public health care system, individuals often
seek enhanced services from private doctors or hospitals. Various spending decisions
in federal states are taken at a central level of government, but member regions are
allowed to augment this funding at their own discretion. While some of these `private
contributions' have the characteristic of a private good whose bene¯ts are exclusive to
the contributor, in many cases there are positive consumption externalities from one
individual - or region - to the other. A new or upgraded road or airport bene¯ts visitors
from other countries as well, in the same way as helping the City's poor may reduce
crime rates, thereby feeding back on other citizens. When a state government tightens
federal regulation on vehicle or industry pollution, neighboring states will often bene¯t
from this local policy measure.
The aim of the present paper is to explore situations of this type in a stylized model. A
group of agents makes a decision to provide goods or services in a democratic fashion,
using majority voting to determine the level of spending. Each agent can also enhance
the consumption of this good, by privately buying additional amounts. Finally, public
and private provision may give rise to consumption externalities across all agents in
society. Our framework thus follows a line of research (for a brief review, see below)
which combines two well known models in the literature: the democratic choice of
policymaking under majority rule, and voluntary private contributions to (impure)
public goods. Addressing these two aspects in a uni¯ed setting allows to tackle many
questions of signi¯cant interest. The technical analysis, however, is challenging: the
voting and contribution decisions of all agents are interrelated, and subject to strategic
behavior. For this reason, is is a priori unclear whether the median voter theorem as
a convenient tool to characterize political outcomes applies in the present setting.1
1Stiglitz (1974) and Glomm-Ravikumar (1998) show that single-peakedness usually does not prevail
in models where individuals can choose whether to consume a publicly provided private good such as
schooling, or to consume a private alternative instead.
1One contribution of the paper is to show that these di±culties can be overcome in
various versions of the baseline model which is analyzed here. We ¯rst explore a setting
where private contributions are made simultaneously and non-cooperatively in a ¯rst
stage, before a political decision on the uniform ¯nancing of the public good is taken in
a second stage. In this regime with ex-ante contributions (or for short `ex-ante regime'),
individual preferences at the policy stage are single peaked for any arbitrary pro¯le of
initial contributions. The median voter theorem then applies and the individual with
median preferences determines the policy outcome. In contrast to the familiar majority
voting scenario, though, the identity of the median voter is endogenous: it depends on
the vector of initial private contributions, speci¯cally because an individual's private
buy decision in stage one generally reduces her stage two policy preferences relative to
those of other individuals. Nevertheless, we establish that no `rank reversal' will occur
so that in equilibrium, the `natural' median individual (the median voter under pure
public provision without private contributions) always remains the pivotal decision
maker. With this result, one can then immediately show that only high-preference
individuals voluntarily contribute ex ante. These individuals are well aware of the
crowding out e®ect of their contributions; with consumption externalities, equilibrium
contributions will not only be smaller than those in absence of public provision, but
they will be even smaller than the best responses to the policy level implemented ex
post. Also, the equilibrium policy is strictly smaller while everybody's public goods
consumption is strictly larger than in a system with purely public provision where
private topping up is infeasible.
We then turn to a scenario where the above timing is reversed (the ex-post regime).
Most existing papers focus on this setting only: it allows for a policy commitment
because democratic decisions are made ¯rst, before individual contributions can be
made. In comparison to the ex-ante regime, the analysis is severely complicated by
the fact that in presence of externalities, individual preferences over policies are not
necessarily single peaked. To see this intuitively, notice that when comparing di®erent
policy levels, the vector of subsequent private contributions and, potentially, the set
of contributors changes. An individual may be a contributor for a small but not for
a large policy, making the shape of his utility function di±cult to predict. One of the
2central ¯ndings of the paper is that notwithstanding this problem, the results of the
median voter theorem continue to hold. To demonstrate this outcome, we show that all
individuals with natural preferences larger than the natural median individual prefer
a larger policy over the one preferred by the median, while all individual with smaller
natural preferences prefer a smaller policy. As a consequence, the policy preferred
by the natural median cannot be defeated in majority voting, which makes her the
democratic decision maker in society. Applying the median voter theorem then allows
a precise characterization of equilibrium contributions and equilibrium policies. Among
other things, equilibrium policies are shown to be smaller than in the ex-ante regime,
while private contributions are larger.
A logical next step is the economic comparison of di®erent institutional regimes. Both
ex ante and ex post regime have in common that only a subset of high-preference agents
make private contributions, while all other individuals including the median and all
people with lower preferences do not.2 However, private contributions in the ex-post
setting are larger than in the ex-ante setting, while the reverse pattern characterizes
the respective equilibrium policies. These ¯ndings can easily be understood in terms
of the commitment capabilities assigned to the relevant agents. In the ex-post setting,
the median voter as the pivotal player knows that implementing a relatively small pol-
icy will trigger large contributions from high-preference individuals. Reducing public
provision boosts the median voter's private-goods consumption, while the associated
loss in public good consumption is at least partially mitigated through enhanced pri-
vate contributions of high-preference individuals. Conversely, in the ex-ante setting
where private contributions are made ¯rst, each potential contributor knows that low-
ering his private contribution induces a larger public provision. Hence, high-preference
individuals can partially free ride on public provision.3 These di®erent commitment
2Hence, a majority of the population never makes a private contribution. In general (and in
presence of externalities), even some agents with larger-than-median-preferences will not privately
contribute because in contrast to the preferences revealed in the political process, a private topping-
up decision does not involve cost sharing with other agents.
3For the polar case of pure public goods, it is also relatively easy to compare total public goods
consumption in either regime: while it is larger in the ex-post regime when income e®ects are absent
and if the set of contributors is non-empty in each regime, the opposite can happen otherwise.
3opportunities induce equilibrium policies to be strictly larger in the ex-ante regime as
compared to the ex-post regime. Moreover, equilibrium policies in both dual regimes
are smaller than those in a pure public-provision setting: with normal preferences, the
median voter's private goods consumption cannot be lower in a dual system where the
contributions of higher-preference individuals raise public goods consumption. Hence,
in a hybrid regime, she will choose a smaller policy.
From a political economy perspective, it is important to explore the relative support
of di®erent regimes by the citizens in society. For a regime change to happen, a well
de¯ned majority or super-majority of agents must prefer some alternative institution
over the status quo. Again, our model allows to derive interesting and unambiguous
results. A majority of citizens, comprising all individuals with low preferences for the
public good, prefers the ex-post regime over both the ex-ante regime and pure public
provision. However, a sizable minority of high-demand citizens may oppose a transition
from the pure public to the system with ex-post contributions, in fear of exploitation by
the majority that controls the political decision making. Strikingly, no such resistance
arises in case of a design change from the pure public to the ex-ante contributions
regime. In fact, we show that the population of agents unanimously supports this
transition. This Pareto optimality result may provide some guidance for the direction
of policy reforms in areas where the ex ante regime is likely to apply. It says that a
hybrid public-private system can be unanimously desired if designed in the right way:
after the public decision is taken, no additional private contributions should be allowed,
while these contributions are encouraged prior to this decision.
As a ¯nal step, we endogenize the timing and allow agents to make private contributions
before and after the policy is chosen. This setting is not only of independent interest but
is the most natural framework in situations where governments are unable to control
the amount and timing of private contributions. Immediate intuition may suggest
that economic outcomes must coincide with those for the ex-post setting; after all, the
median voter (who remains pivotal) can still choose the same public provision level
at the policy stage, forcing high-demand citizens to privately contribute at the ¯nal
stage. Perhaps surprisingly, though, we show that this intuition is misleading. In fact,
4the endogenous regime will often dominate the ex-post setting at least for a majority
of the population, including all high-demand agents. The explanation is based on
an interesting reciprocal commitment argument. Speci¯cally, the ex-ante contribution
stage allows high preference individuals to commit to contributions larger than those
made in the equilibrium of the ex-post regime. In response, the stage-2 median voter
anticipates that, for a reasonable range of policy choices, there will be no additional ex-
post contributions.4 Large ex-ante contributions thus o®set the public decisionmakers'
interest in strategic underprovision, inducing her to vote in favor of increased public
provision.5 The interesting consequence is a `crowding in' rather than the familiar
`crowding out' e®ect - private contributions and public provision are both larger than
in the ex-post regime. Also, a majority of citizens prefers the system with endogenous
timing over both alternative hybrid regimes, and over pure public provision. Under
majority vote, this institutional design thus emerges as the only stable alternative.
2 Existing Literature
Our paper is part of a growing literature that explores the mechanics and the political
economy implications of a dual private-public provision of goods and services. Most
existing contributions con¯ne attention to what we call the ex-post system, where the
political decision is taken by majority rule, before individuals can privately contribute
in a second stage. Epple and Romano (1996) pioneered the analysis of this scenario.
They explore a dual health care system, with a public-provision element being funded
through linear income taxes, as chosen in the democratic process. According to their
main ¯ndings, the equilibrium provision of public services in the hybrid system is larger
than in a purely public system, or a purely private system. In addition, a majority of
citizens strictly prefers the dual regime. Combining theoretical analysis with empirical
4This is true unless the median voter implements a very small policy, a choice she will generally
¯nd unappealing.
5The equilibrium policy is then a best response to the (and only the) ex-ante private contributions.
In contrast, in the ex-post setting, the equilibrium policy choice is strictly lower than the best response
to the equilibrium ex-post contributions: for strategic reasons, policy underprovision arises in order
to stimulate subsequent private contributions.
5testing, Fernandez and Rogerson (2003) compare a variety of school funding systems in
a dual provision setting. For the cases of pure private, pure public, or the dual ex-post
regime, their theoretical results largely coincide with those in Epple and Romano.6
In both of these papers, the relevant good is modeled as a private good, which imposes
no consumption externalities on other agents in society. For this reason, the political
choice is not implicated by strategic behavior on the voters' parts, which is shown
to guarantee the single peakedness of individual preferences and the validity of the
median voter theorem.7 Epple and Romano (2003) shift the focus of their previous
research, by considering the case of a pure public rather than a private good. In order
to make the strategic e®ects of voting tractable, individuals are assumed to behave
`myopically' in the sense of disregarding the e®ect of their ¯rst-stage political votes
on second-stage private contributions. Epple and Romano show that in this setting
with not fully rational agents, equilibrium does not necessarily exist but if it does,
the natural median voter is the pivotal individual. In a related theoretical setting but
in the context of policymaking in federations, Hafer and Landa (2005) ¯nd that the
lack of preference single peakedness generally prevents the applicability of the median
voter theorem. Assuming Cobb-Douglas preferences, they derive su±cient conditions
for equilibrium existence, and provide a variety of additional characterization results.
The contributions closest to he present work are those by Cremer and Palfrey (2000,
2006), and by Alesina et al. (2005). In line with the funding assumption that we
impose, public provision is ¯nanced through uniform lump sum taxation. All these pa-
pers are set in the context of federal systems. Cremer and Palfrey investigate `federal
mandates', implemented by a central government via majority vote among individual
regions. Essentially, a federal mandate imposes a minimum or maximum standard on a
policy whose costs are incurred by individual states. These standards can subsequently
be tightened by state legislation, which in our setting corresponds to a private contri-
6Their paper also examines several other possible regimes, and provides a thorough empirical
analysis.
7Note, though, that even in a setting where voters have identical references, the median voter need
not coincide with the median income individual. Under income taxation, rich individuals may in fact
favor lower taxes because they face a larger absolute tax burden than poorer agents.
6bution. In Cremer and Palfrey (2000), policy choices and private contributions are not
associated with external e®ects on regions, and again the median voter theorem applies.
It is shown that equilibrium mandates are tighter than desired by a majority, and some
high-demand states augment the mandate by imposing even more rigid standards. Cre-
mer and Palfrey (2006) allow policies to cause positive externalities. According to their
main ¯nding, majority vote equilibria cannot be guaranteed to exist. To circumvent
this problem, the paper characterizes the set of `local' policy equilibria, which is the
set of policies which is majority preferred to other policies in the vicinity.8 Alesina et
al. (2005) consider a framework similar to Cremer and Palfrey, but with homogenous
agents within districts. Their paper explores not only the ex-post regime, but also
the ex-ante regime. While Alesina et al. argue that a majority of agents prefers the
ex-ante system over the pure public system, we show that in fact, the ex-ante system
is preferred unanimously. Moreover, their paper acknowledges that all results require
the validity of the median voter theorem, but do not prove its validity.9
Our paper goes beyond existing results in showing that in dual institutional systems,
the median voter theorem often holds even in presence of consumption externalities,
and with fully rational voters. Under income taxation, high-income individuals face
a tradeo® between their income-driven higher demand, and the redistributive aspects
of higher taxes. While one of the central arguments in our paper shows that no high-
income individual will ever prefer a policy smaller than the one preferred by the median
voter (and vice versa), this property cannot generally be expected to hold in a setting
with income taxation, making it more di±cult to obtain transparent results.10 With re-
gard to empirical relevance, both scenarios seem appropriate in di®erent circumstances.
Central funding in federations is sometimes (not always) based on the per capita wealth
8There is one signi¯cant di®erence between the settings analyzed in Cremer and Palfrey, and our
paper. While in Cremer and Palfrey (2006) each voter in each region participates in federal policy
decisionmaking, our setting can be interpreted as one where only the district medians cast their
federal votes. Our results suggest that this seemingly minor modi¯cation restores the existence of
global majority vote equilibrium.
9Alesina et al. acknowledge that the theorem may not hold (See p. 614 of their paper).
10We conjecture, though, that under some assumption one the rank order of preferences often made
in the literature, this results extends to the case of redistributive income taxation as well. Note also
that in absence of income heterogeneity, lump sum taxation and income taxation are the same.
7of individual member states; contributions to a state funded health care system are
made lump sum in Canada, but through progressive taxes in many European countries.
Federal mandates are usually imposed uniformly of all member states within a feder-
ation. Unless there are reasons to believe that implementation costs systematically
di®er across states, uniform taxation seems a good ¯rst pass on this scenario.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3 below describes the baseline
model. Section 4 explores some benchmark scenarios. Section 5 provides a general
analysis of the systems with ex-ante and ex-post contributions, and Section 6 illus-
trates these results. Section 7 analyzes a system with endogenous contribution timing.
Section 8 brie°y discusses the switch from a private market regime, and Section 9
concludes.
3 The Model
Consider an economy with N ¸ 3 agents, where N is odd. Individual i derives his
utility from the consumption of a private good xi, and a public good Gi which will be
de¯ned more precisely below. We will assume that agent i's utility function Ui(xi;Gi)
is quasiconcave, and that both x and G are normal goods according to i's preferences.
Moreover, we impose the standard Inada conditions and normalize the prices of both
public and private good to one. Agents may di®er in their exogenous incomes, yi, and
in their tastes for the public good.11
The agents play a version of the following general game. In a stage 1, they can simul-
taneously and non-cooperatively make private `ex-ante' contributions ^ gi towards the
public good. These contributions become public information of all agents; they can
alternatively be interpreted as individual i's private purchase and consumption of the
commodity in the marketplace.12 In a subsequent policy stage, stage 2, all individ-
11Throughout the paper, we assume that incomes are su±ciently large that each individual is able
to pay his tax contribution in any equilibrium. At least implicitly, this assumption is shared by all
papers in the literature.
12In both interpretations, the `public good' may be o®ered by suppliers in a competitive market, or
it may be produced in home production where all individuals have access to the same technology.
8uals decide in a political decisionmaking process on a mandatory uniform lump-sum
contribution g that is imposed on each agent. For concreteness, we follow the positive
literature on public goods supply and assume that g is chosen by majority vote. Fi-
nally, in stage 3, individuals can simultaneously expand public-goods consumption by
making additional `ex-post' contributions, ~ gi. An agent's consumption of the private
numeraire good is then ci = yi ¡ g ¡ ^ gi ¡ ~ gi. As we have already emphasized in the
Introduction, an analysis of private ex-ante and ex-post contributions allows us to ex-
plore the commitment e®ects of policy choices and of private consumption decisions,
respectively.
Regarding the characteristics of commodity G, we will allow for pure and impure forms
of public goods or services. The public goods consumption of each individual is com-
posed of a uniform amount GU which is provided to everyone through the political pro-
cess, and of the private contributions of the individual himself, and of other individuals.
In particular, GU = g(1+¯(N¡1)) where ¯ 2 (0;1) indicates the degree of consumption
externalities. For ¯ = 0, there are no spillovers and GU becomes a private good with
uniform consumption requirement. For ¯ = 1, we analyze a pure public good, while
all interior speci¯cations of ¯ capture intermediate characteristics. The overall public
good consumption of a citizen i is then denoted as Gi = GU +[^ gi+~ gi+¯
P
j6=i(^ gj+~ gj)],
where private contributions of individuals j 6= i again cause spillovers at a rate ¯. Note
that unless ¯ = 1 where Gi = G for all i, individuals who contribute more towards the
public good have a higher overall consumption.
Let g be a public policy and ^ g and ~ g be the vectors of ex-ante and ex-post private
contributions, respectively.13 For subsequent reference it is useful to de¯ne
¢





as individual i's marginal rate of substitution between the private and the public good.
We impose
13In what follows, we assume that g 2 [0; ¹ g] where the maximum policy ¹ g is smaller than the
income of the poorest individual in society. Alternatively, we could assume that an agent's policy
contribution is minfyi;gg, and close the model by imposing a su±ciently harsh punishment in case
that the individual pays less than yi. This latter speci¯cation would not alter any qualitative results
but signi¯cantly complicate the exposition.
9Assumption 1. (Single crossing property) For any g and ^ g; ~ g with the property
^ gi = ^ gj, ~ gi = ~ gj for all i;j, the rank order of the vector ¢(g; ^ g; ~ g) = f¢igi=1;:::;n remains
unchanged. We say that an individual i = 1;:::;n with a higher index exhibits `larger
preferences' for the public good.
The single crossing assumption allows us to order individuals according to their `natu-
ral' rank in terms of preferences towards the public good: for any arbitrary public-good
level generated by identical funding from each individual, the ranking of the marginal
rates of substitution across individuals remains the same. Notice that the de¯nition
is °exible enough to accommodate not only taste, but also income di®erences. For
example, consider two individuals with identical homogenous preferences but di®er-
ent incomes. For identical individual contributions to the public good, their private
consumption di®ers, and the lower-income individual displays a smaller ¢(¢) and is
considered a lower-preference individual. Another important class of preferences con-
sistent with Assumption 1 are quasilinear utilities, where agent preferences and incomes
are heterogenous: Ui = ci+®iH(Gi), with ®i > 0 being a preference parameter for the
public good. In this representation, an individual with larger ®i us characterized by a
larger index i. In what follows, we will say that individual m is the `natural' median
individual according to the ordering described above.
4 Benchmark cases
Before going into a general analysis, we brie°y investigate the two simple benchmark
cases of pure public provision, and a situation where G is a private good.
4.1 Pure public Provision
As a benchmark, suppose public goods are provided exclusively through the political
process, that is, no private consumption decisions can be made. Each individual i
prefers a policy outcome g
pp
i = arg maxg Ui(yi ¡g;g(1+¯(N ¡1)), which is implicitly
de¯ned by the ¯rst-order condition ¢i(¢) = Ui
G(ci;Gi)=Ui
c(ci;Gi) = 1=(1+¯(N ¡1)) ´
101=z · 1. Note that under our previous assumptions, the single-peakedness requirement
is satis¯ed so that the median voter theorem applies. Moreover, since ¢i and thus g
pp
i
are increasing in the index i, the preferences of individual m with median bliss point
represent the unique outcome of majority voting. We have
Proposition 1. Consider pure public provision of G. The unique equilibrium policy
gpp





G (ym ¡ gpp
m;gpp
m(1 + ¯(N ¡ 1))
Um




m(1 + ¯(N ¡ 1))
=
1





Under the Inada conditions, the selected policy gpp
m is interior. Moreover, in the special
case where individuals di®er only in their incomes, normality ensures the median-
income individual to be the median voter m in the community.
4.2 Purely private goods
Before commencing a general analysis of institutional regimes with ex-ante and ex-
post contributions, it is useful to consider the special case of a purely private good
¯ = 0. This case has received most of the attention in the existing literature on
dual institutions. Notice that since consumption externalities are absent, voting is not
subject to strategic behavior, a feature that considerably simpli¯es the analysis. We
can state
Proposition 2. Suppose ¯ = 0. In both the ex-ante and the ex-post regime, there
exists a continuum of equilibria, characterized by equilibrium policies g¤ 2 [0;gpp
m]. In
addition,
a) Each high-preference agent with rank i ¸ m consumes the ¯rst best amount of
public goods G¤
i, given by ¢i(G¤
i) = 1.
b) For any equilibrium policy g¤ satisfying g > g
pp
1 , a subset of low-preference agents
with ranks j < m is forced to overconsume, ¢j(G¤
j) < 1. The size of this subset
strictly increases in g¤, and it comprises all individuals j < m if g¤ = gpp
m.
11Proof: Consider the ex-post regime and a policy g · gpp
m. After any such policy has
been implemented, each individual k ¯nds it optimal to privately contribute ~ gk =
maxfgpp
m ¡g;0g in stage 2. Hence, agent k overconsumes relative to the e±cient amount
if g > gpp
m, while k is able to achieve his ¯rst best consumption gpp
m otherwise. For this
reason, any g 2 [0;gpp
m] can be supported as an equilibrium policy: each individual
i ¸ m and thus a majority of agents is indi®erent between any policy from this set but
strictly prefers each of them over any g > gpp
m. Conversely, no g > gpp
m is a candidate
for policy equilibrium because it would be majority rejected.
Next, consider the regime with ex-ante contributions. In this setting, no g > gpp
m can be
the chosen equilibrium policy in stage 2, for two reasons. First, in absence of private
contributions, any such policy is dominated by majority. Second, each individual's
preferred policy is single-peaked, decreasing in his own contribution, and (since ¯ = 0)
una®ected by the contributions of other agents. Conversely, each policy g < gpp
m can be
supported as a majority voting equilibrium. To see this, consider a contribution vector
^ g¡k for which without agent k's participation, some policy g¤(< gpp
m) would be selected
in majority vote. Note that for any such g¤, vector ^ g¡k always exists: each individual
i ¸ m can always contribute ^ gi = g
pp
i ¡ g¤ so that g¤ becomes i's preferred stage 2
policy (note that if g¤ < g
pp
i , a subset of lower-preference individuals j < m can do the
same). Finally, for any ^ g¡k, k's best response is to contribute ^ gk = g
pp
k ¡ g¤ in stage
1, and to prefer policy g¤ as well. Accordingly, a majority of the population prefers
policy g¤ over any alternative policy. Hence, a majority including any i ¸ m achieves
a ¯rst-best outcome, while a subset of minority individuals (with size increasing in g¤)
does not privately contribute but is forced to overconsume relative to the ¯rst best
whenever g¤ > g
pp
1 .14 2
In the private-goods case, there is a continuum of equilibrium outcomes, which are
the same irrespective of the timing of private contributions. All of these equilibria
are e±cient for individuals with larger than median preferences (including m), in the
14Note also that no individual i for which g
pp
i < g¤ will overconsume or underconsume in an
equilibrium with policy g¤: these individuals can always adjust their stage-1 contributions to a level
where they prefer the induced equilibrium policy in stage 2.
12sense of equating marginal rate of substitution and marginal rate of transformation.
However, for equilibrium policies larger than the preferred consumption of the lowest-
preference agent (which is identical to g
pp
1 ), a subset of low-demand agents consumes
and pays more than desired. In addition, the largest possible equilibrium policy, gpp
m,
coincides with the unique equilibrium under pure public provision as derived above.
Both dual regimes thus Pareto dominate pure public provision: individuals i > m are
strictly better o® because they can enhance their consumption of the public good while,
at the same time, some lower preference individuals enhance their utilities by reducing
(or even avoiding) overconsumption.15
In contrast to our setting with uniform tax contributions, multiplicity of equilibria does
not arise in a setting with income-dependent contributions.16 For example, with linear
income taxes as analyzed in Epple and Romano (1996) and Fernandez and Rogerson
(2003), individuals have strict preferences over tax rates even if there are no external-
ities. While individuals with higher-than-average incomes strictly prefer zero public
provision, lower-income individuals bene¯t from the tax contributions of richer indi-
viduals, and each of them favors a type speci¯c positive tax level.17 As we show in the
following Sections, however, externalities generally restore uniqueness of equilibrium in
our framework.
15Notice that a purely private regime without ay public provision would dominate a dual regime.
The reason is simple: Since the good in question is purely private and the ¯nancing mode does not
entail a redistributive element, private consumption decisions must be individually optimal. Certainly,
this property does not extend to a scenario with consumption externalities.
16Cremer and Palfrey consider uniform taxation. They resolve the multiplicity issue by assuming
that regional populations are heterogenous, but no individual knows his place in the regional preference
distribution. Voting in favor of his preferred consumption level is then dominant strategy at the policy
stage.
17However, the preferences of below-average income agents are not necessarily monotone in income:
while more a²uent individuals within this group ceteris paribus favor larger consumption, poorer
individuals pay a smaller unit tax price.
135 Analysis
5.1 Dual System with Ex-ante contributions
In this Section, we provide a general analysis for a situation where only ex-ante private
contributions ^ gi are feasible or relevant. The public good in question might be a
museum or University construction project whose technical speci¯cations (design, size
etc.) are irreversibly determined in the stage-2 political process.18 Alternatively, the
ex-ante contributions scenario might represent situations in which individual agents -
such as states in a federation, or charities - act as `leaders' who commit to a contribution
level before political decisions are made. For instance, the extraordinary endowment
of the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation make this charity a strategic player in Third
World aid.
Using subgame perfection as the appropriate equilibrium concept, we ¯rst analyze
the stage-2 political equilibrium, before proceeding to the initial private-contributions
stage. Two crucial issues need to be addressed. First, it has to be shown that individual
stage-2 preferences are single-peaked so that majority voting equilibrium exists and the
preferences of the (endogenously chosen) median voter prevail in political equilibrium.
Second, upon establishing single-peakedness, we must ¯nd out whether in Nash equi-
librium, the `natural' median m or some other individual actually becomes the median
voter. Since each individual's policy preferences in stage 2 depend on the voluntary
contribution pro¯le of all agents, the answer to this latter question is not immediate.
We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For any arbitrary stage-1 contribution pro¯le ^ g = f^ gigi=1;:::;n, individual
preferences in stage 2 over g are single-peaked. Hence, the choice of the individual M
with stage-2 median preferences, say gM¤(^ g), prevails in majority vote.
Proof: Consider an arbitrary contribution pro¯le ^ g. For any such pro¯le, an individual
18The political decision on project design then essentially determines the scale of the public good,
and additional private contributions would leave consumption levels of this good una®ected.
14i's preferences over policies g are described by the utility function
U
i(yi ¡ ^ gi ¡ g;g(1 + ¯(N ¡ 1)) + ¯
X
j6=i
^ gj + ^ gi):
Since preferences are quasiconcave by assumption, they are single-peaked in g and (if
interior) the maximizer gi¤ for individual i is described by the ¯rst-order condition
¢






= 1=(1 + ¯(N ¡ 1)) = 1=z:
The individual i = M with ex-post median preferences then determines the policy
outcome in pairwise majority vote.19 2
To be more speci¯c about the equilibrium outcome, we now investigate the private-
contributions game in stage 1. The analysis ¯rst yields
Lemma 2. There exists an equilibrium in which the natural median m becomes the
median voter. No individual j with index j · m contributes in stage 1, while some of
the higher-demand individuals j > m may contribute.
Proof: Consider the stage-2 median voter as induced by the stage-1 contribution pro¯le
^ g. Call this individual M (again, notice she is not necessarily the `natural' median m).
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose an equilibrium with M = m exists, and no
j · m contributes. Since the lowest-preference (n + 1)=2 individuals do not invest in
stage 1, their ranking of policies g corresponds to the natural order of their preferences,
and individual m by de¯nition exhibits the maximum bliss point gm¤(^ g) within this
group. Accordingly, individual m is the median individual in stage 2 unless some agent
i > m contributes ^ gi in a way that gi¤(^ g) < gm¤(^ g).
We show that indeed no i > m will make such a contribution. To see this, note ¯rst that
because of normality the preferred second-stage policy gi¤ of any individual i is strictly
decreasing in ^ gi. For ^ gi = 0, this implies gi¤ > gm¤, irrespective of the contribution
pro¯le ^ g¡i = f^ g1;:::; ^ gi¡1; ^ gi+1;:::; ^ gng of all other individuals. Suppose one individual
19For su±ciently large initial contributions ^ g, M may prefer the corner solution g = 0. In this case,
she shares her preferences with more than half of the population and remains decisive in stage 2.
15i > m contributes in a way that gi¤ < gm¤ and gi¤ · gM¤ (note that in order to generate
m 6= M there must be at least one such individual i). The stage-2 optimality condition
for i then implies
¢





and holds with equality if M = i. We establish that for ¯ > 0, this condition violates
the optimality condition for i's stage-1 investments. For contributions ^ gi inducing
gi¤ < gm¤, agent i's stage-1 ¯rst-order condition reads
¢
i(^ gi; ^ g¡i;g












The second term on the right-hand side re°ects the e®ect of ^ gi on the policy chosen
by (and possibly, on the identity of) the median individual. Note that dgM¤=d^ gi < 0
whenever ¯ > 0: with normal preferences, raising i's contribution lowers the preferred
stage-2 policy of any individual, and thus, of the induced median voter.20 In addition,
dgM¤=d^ gi > ¡1 because otherwise, a raise in ^ gi would induce a lower public goods
consumption for M, thus violating preference normality. From the stage-2 optimality
condition (2), the term in square brackets in (3) Ui
c(¢)¡Ui
G(¢)z is zero if M = i, yielding
an immediate contradiction since (2) and (3) become incompatible. Otherwise, when





G(¢)z]. This condition simpli¯es to 1 > z which is impossible. Taken
together, the assumed behavior cannot be optimal for agent i, implying individual
i > m will never contribute in a way as to switch stage-2 preferences with m.21 To
complete the argument, note that m will be the median voter if she does not contribute.
Hence, m will not invest since she can always consume the same amount of public goods
spending a smaller amount of private resources. Finally, since gj¤ < gm¤ for any j < m,
none of these individuals will be a contributor which proves the lemma. 2
20This is true because raising ^ gi can alter the identity of the median voter in only one direction:
an individual k with a smaller stage-2 ¢k might become M. This indirect e®ect reinforces the direct
e®ect of increasing ^ gi.
21For ¯ = 0, the last Section has shown that each individual i > m will invest in such a way that
he shares his stage-2 preferences with the median-income individual. Again, Lemma 2 continues to
apply because m remains pivotal in stage 2. See our discussion below.
16Lemma 3. The equilibrium characteristics as described in Lemma 2 are unique if
¯ > 0.
Proof: The proof of Lemma 2 immediately implies that as long as ^ gm = 0, the natural
median is the induced median individual in stage 2, m = M. Speci¯cally, for any
individual i > m, contributions with the property gi¤(^ g) · gM¤(^ g) were shown to
be incompatible with utility maximization. Suppose now there exists an additional
equilibrium in which ^ gm > 0. Two cases need to be distinguished. First, suppose that
gm¤ > gM¤ in this assumed equilibrium. For this to apply, at least one individual i > m
has contributed in a way that gi¤ < gm¤ (and gi¤ · gM¤). But invoking the arguments
of Lemma 2, for any individual i > m contributions with this property cannot be
the best response to contribution pro¯le ^ g¡i. Second, suppose that gm¤ < gM¤ in the
assumed equilibrium. Note that for any ^ g¡m, individual m can always generate stage-2
references gm¤ ¸ gM¤ by not contributing in stage 1: for ^ gm = 0, m = M unless one
individual i > m invests in a way that gi¤ · gm¤. As a consequence, for ^ gm = 0,
M's stage-2 preferences in the assumed equilibrium would be smaller than those of
individual m. However, contributing a positive amount so large that gm¤ · gM¤ cannot
be m's best response to any contribution pro¯le ^ g¡m of other individuals. Analogously
to the arguments in Lemma 2, for gm¤ · gM¤ to apply, m's stage-2 references would
have to satisfy ¢m(^ gm; ^ g¡m;gM¤(^ g)) · 1=z · 1=(1+¯) · 1. But contribution ^ gm then
violates the stage-1 optimality condition (??) for i = m (at least) if ¯ > 0, yielding a
contradiction. Combining these results, there cannot exist equilibria where individual
m contributes ^ gm > 0; as a consequence, M = m and the equilibrium characteristics
given in Lemma 2 are unique. 2
We have established that the natural median individual m will be pivotal for the
political decision in equilibrium, and she will provide no private ex-ante contribution
on her own. While the proof is quite intricate, there is an intuitive logic behind
this result. No individual with larger natural preferences has an incentive to switch
preference ranks with m: voluntarily moving `to the left of the median' means that
an agent contributed too much, which cannot be best response to the strategy pro¯le
of other individuals. But if no (high preference) individual wants to switch ranks, m
17has no incentive to contribute anything because she is the median voter anyway, which
allows her to implement her preferred public goods consumption in the political process
without spending a large amount of private resources.
We are now prepared to summarize the equilibrium outcomes.
Proposition 3. Suppose individuals can make ex-ante contributions ^ gi into public poli-
cies. In equilibrium, the `natural' median-preference individual m becomes the median
voter and chooses the equilibrium policy gm¤(^ g). Moreover,
1) No individual j with natural preferences j · m contributes in stage 1. All these
individuals consume the same amount of same amount of the public good, G¤
j =
G¤
m = gm¤[1 + ¯(N ¡ 1)] + ¯
P
i ^ gi.
2) Some highest-preference individuals i > m may make a private contribution in
stage 1. Equilibrium contributions are rank-ordered, i.e., ^ gn ¸ ^ gn¡1 ¸ ::: ¸ ^ gm+1,
with strict inequality for positive contributions. Accordingly, the public goods
consumption of individual i is G¤
i = G¤




m+1 (with strict inequality whenever ¯ < 1 and ^ gi > 0 for one of two
adjacent individuals).
While most of these results have been established above before, the additional mono-
tonicity properties are proved in the Appendix. In fact, monotonicity of contributions
in type is very intuitive. Higher-preference individuals make larger private contribu-
tions, and therefore consume larger quantities of the public good in equilibrium.
It is instructive to compare the economic outcomes achieved in the hybrid regime with
ex-ante contributions, to those of pure public system where no private contributions
are allowed. This is done in
Proposition 4. Consider the hybrid ex-ante system (superscript ea). In comparison
to a public system (superscript pp), we have the following results:
1) public policy provision is characterized by gea · gpp, with strict inequality if ¯ > 0
and if the set of contributors is non-empty.




j , with strict inequality if ¯ > 0, if the set of contributors is non-empty,
and if consumption is strictly normal. Contributors consume even more of the
public good whenever ¯ < 1.
Proof: To prove part 1), recall that individual m chooses public policy g in both regimes,
and in a way that ¢m = 1=z. Suppose ¯ > 0 and let the set of contributors in the
hybrid setting be non-empty. If public goods consumption is only weakly normal (as
in a quasi-linear setting), m's optimization leads Gm = gz + ¯
P
i2C ^ gi to be constant
across regimes. Accordingly, gea < gpp. If consumption of both goods is strictly normal,
the median voter's private consumption cm in the hybrid regime must be strictly larger,
which again implies a smaller equilibrium policy. Part 2) follows immediately: with
strictly normal preferences and because cm is larger in the dual-provision setting, Gm
will also be larger in this regime. 2
From a policy perspective, it is important to know which individuals support the hybrid
over the pure public system, or vice versa. Our ¯ndings here are very strong.
Proposition 5. All individuals unanimously prefer the hybrid ex-ante system over the
public system. This preference is strict (a) in presence of externalities, ¯ > 0, and (b)
if the equilibrium set of private contributors is non-empty.
Proof: Consider an individual j who does not contribute in the dual system. For
any such individual, his public consumption is characterized by Gr
j = Gr
m in regime





m (with strict inequality if ¯ > 0
and if the set of contributors is non-empty). Hence, cea
j ¸ c
pp
j and individual j prefers
the ex-ante system. Consider now an individual i who contributes ^ gi > 0. If instead this
agent had decided not to contribute, he would again receive a utility not smaller than
in the public system: ¯rst, if he is the only contributor, a decision not to contribute
would trigger identical equilibrium policies and consumption levels in either regime.
Second, if there are other contributors, ^ gi = 0 would induce Gea
i ¸ G
pp
i , and gea
m · gpp
m
(with strict inequality if ¯ > 0). Hence, i would prefer the ex-ante system, and strictly
19so if ¯ > 0. By revealed preference, making a contribution must raise i's utility even
further. Hence, each equilibrium contributor i prefers the hybrid ex-ante system which
completes the proof. 2
The result of Proposition 4 is intriguing, and may have important policy implications.
According to the Proposition, each agent prefers the °exible public-private system over
public provision, and strictly so in the most plausible and relevant scenarios of positive
spillovers and a non-empty set of private contributors. Hence, a policy reform from
a pure public system to the ex-ante dual system is Pareto preferred, provided that
individuals are allowed to expand their consumption of the public good before the
policy decision is made. Our ¯nding remarkably di®ers from all results in the existing
literature on hybrid regimes. While this literature shows that some form of hybrid
system is usually preferred by a simple majority, in reality a constitutional change to
switch from a pure (public or private) to a hybrid system often demands the approval
of some well-de¯ned super-majority. Proposition 4 shows that a Pareto-improving
institutional change is not necessarily infeasible.22
5.2 Ex-post Contributions: Policy Commitment
We now turn to a setting where the order of moves in a dual public-private system is
reversed. To do so, suppose the policy g is determined in a ¯rst stage by democratic
majority voting. In a subsequent second stage, each individual can boost the provision
of the public good by making a private contribution ~ gi. As before, these ex-post
contributions are made simultaneously and in a non-cooperative fashion. This setting
has received most of the attention in the existing literature. In a federalism context,
22Remember that most of the relevant literature exclusively focuses on settings with ex-post private
contributions; see below. The only exception is the work by Alesina et al. (2005) who analyze basically
the same setting (but with the restriction to quasi-linear preferences), but arrive at a di®erent result.
While according to Alesina et al. in general only a majority of voters prefers the dual ex-ante system,
we show that the much stronger statement of Proposition 4 applies. Of course, Pareto optimality is
not achieved in a setting with intra-regional heterogeneity as analyzed in Cremer and Palfrey's work.
While all regional median voters (the agents in our setting) favor the ex ante system, a minority of
low-preference individuals in high-preference districts may oppose it.
20for example, it can be interpreted as imposing the strategic `leader' role on the central
government, and the `follower' role on regions or lower-tier policy makers within a
federation.
As has been emphasized in this previous literature, one cannot generally take the
existence of a political equilibrium for granted if there are externalities, for the following
reason. The set of second-stage contributors, as well as the size of their respective
contributions, depend on the policy g that was implemented in the ¯rst stage. Single-
peakedness of preferences at the policy stage is then elusive because the shape of
individual utility pro¯les is a®ected by changes in the set of ex-post contributors.
A change in policies may induce an individual to become a contributor or a non-
contributor, respectively, altering not only his individual utility representation but
also the best responses of other members of society.
An important ¯nding of the present paper is to show that even though the single-
peakedness requirement may not be satis¯ed, the result of the median voter theorem
still applies in our setting. The only tax alternative which cannot be beaten in majority
vote is the alternative proposed by the natural median individual, m. In addition, we
will o®er a precise characterization of this equilibrium, and provide a detailed compar-
ison to the model with ex-ante contributions.
The central issue is the outcome of the policy choice stage. It is ¯rst established that
each individual j < m with preferences smaller than the natural median will prefer
the policy which is preferred by m over any larger policy level. We call this policy
gep
m, where the abbreviation ep stands for ex post contributions. Second, we show that
any individual i > m with preferences larger than the natural median, prefers the tax
rate favored by m over any smaller tax rate. Combining these results allows to show
that the median voter theorem must hold, the potential non-regularity of preferences
notwithstanding. For subsequent reference, it is useful to de¯ne
² gT
i = g + ~ gi(g) as the total contribution of individual i towards the supply of public
goods;
² G¡i = Gi¡gT
i = g¯(N¡1)+¯
P
j6=i ~ gj as the portion of i's public goods consumption
derived from contributions of all other individuals.
21We now develop our main result in the following lemmas.
Lemma 4: Each individual j < m prefers gep
m over any other policy g > gep
m.
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that individual j strictly prefers some larger policy, say
g¤
j, over gep
m. If this is true, the total contributions of all other individuals under policy
g¤
j exceed those under policy gep
m, that is, G¡j(g¤
j) > G¡j(gep
m). Suppose not. Then, j
could under policy gep
m always replicate his public-goods consumption under policy g¤
j,
by choosing ~ gj(gep
m) > 0 in a way that Gj(gep
m) = Gj(g¤
j).23 At the same time, his total
public goods contribution gT
j would be lower and his private consumption cj would be
higher under policy gep
m, yielding a contradiction. Hence, if j's preferences are strict,
G¡j(g¤
j) > G¡j(gep
m), and j's total consumption of public goods under both policies
regimes is characterized by Gj(g¤
j) ¸ Gj(gep
m) due to normality of preferences.
Consider now individual m who by de¯nition prefers gep
m over g¤
j. Two cases need to be
distinguished. First, G¡m(gep
m) > G¡m(g¤
j) may hold. If in addition Gm(gep
m) ¸ Gm(g¤
j)
(this needs not be true, see below), j can strictly prefer g¤
j and m strictly prefer gep
m





satis¯ed. Note that Gm(¢) = Gj(¢)+(1¡¯)[~ gm(¢)¡~ gj(¢)] = Gj(¢)+(1¡¯)[(gT
m(¢)¡gT
j (¢)].























m). Again using the









m), yielding an immediate contradiction.24










j). Note also that ~ gj will in general
not be j's best response to policy gep
m and contributions G¡j(gep
m) of other individuals. However, ~ gj
de¯nes j's lower utility bound by revealed preference.





m) requires public goods consumption under both policies to
be identical, G(g¤
j) = G(gep
m). To prefer g¤
j over gep





m) (note that as an implication, j makes a positive stage-2 contribution under
policy gep





j), yielding a contradiction.
22Next, suppose again that G¡m(gep
m) > G¡m(g¤
j), but now let Gm(gep
m) < Gm(g¤
j). Notice
that this case can occur only if policy g¤
j forces m to make an excessive total contribution
from his point of view, implying a stage-2 corner solution ~ gm(g¤
j) = 0. But then,
agent j < m must also be a non-contributor (by de¯nition, it is impossible to have







j). Note now that under the rank-order assumption, gT
j (g) · gT
m(g)
for any g. Hence, G¡j(gep
m) ¸ G¡m(gep
m). But since we consider the case G¡m(gep
m) >
G¡m(g¤
j), and since G¡m(g¤
j) = G¡j(g¤
j), this immediately implies G¡j(g¤
j) · G¡j(gep
m),
a contradiction to our previous result.




m). In this case, m's preferences
are consistent only if policy g¤
j forces her to make a contribution g¤
j that m perceives
as excessive. Accordingly, her private contribution is ~ gm(g¤
j) = 0. But if m does not
contribute under policy g¤
j, individual j < m will not make a private contribution







j). Consider now policy gep
m and suppose j's









m) by assumption, normality then
(generically) implies Gm(gep
m) < Gm(g¤
j). Also, since ¢j(¢) < ¢m(¢) for identical total
contributions of j and m (Assumption 1), j must prefer gep
m over g¤
j, given this is m's





can only raise j0s utility under policy gep
m, reinforcing this preference. This yields a
contradiction and completes the proof. 2
Lemma 5: Any individual h > m prefers g¤
m over any policy g < g¤
m.
Proof: The proof mirrors the proof of Lemma 4, and is therefore omitted.
Combining the statements in these lemmas leads to the following important result.
25This is clearly true if both j and m have identical incomes. Suppose not and notice that total
contributions under policy gep
m must be characterized by gT
m(¢) ¸ gT
j (¢) under Assumption 1. Since their
individual contributions under the alternative policy g¤
j are identical, switching from gep
m to g¤
j causes
j's private consumption to decline more. Invoking the single-crossing assumption then establishes the
result.
23Proposition 6. In the dual regime with ex-post contributions, the preferred policy of the
median individual m, gep
m, beats all other policy alternatives g in pairwise comparison.
Proof: By Lemma 3, m and all individuals j < m with smaller preferences for public
goods than m prefer gep
m over any some larger policy g > gep
m. By Lemma 4, m and
all individuals h > m prefer gep
m over any smaller policy g < gep
m. Combined, no other
policy can beat gep
m under majority vote, which proves the result. 2
The next step is to characterize the stage-2 contribution levels of all individuals. We
will see that neither the median individual, nor any individual with smaller preferences,
will make a private contribution. While this sounds intuitive, a rigorous proof is in fact
needed. The core of the argument is to show that for the range of policies for which
the median voter subsequently becomes a contributor, m's ¯rst-period utility is strictly
increasing in the policy level g. For this reason, m's optimal stage-1 choice cannot be
such that she is a contributor in the stage-2 Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 7. Neither the median individual m, nor any smaller preference individ-
ual j < m will contribute in stage 2.
Proof: see the Appendix.
Proposition 7 is perhaps best understood by the following heuristic argument. Consider
a policy level gm su±ciently low that m would contribute in the stage-2 continuation
equilibrium. The median voter knows that raising gm further forces some low-preference
individuals (who are non-contributors in stage 2) to contribute additional resources for
the supply of the public good. As a consequence, raising gm in this range transfers
income from low-preference individuals to high-preference individuals. This allows the
median voter m and all other contributors to reduce their private contributions not only
by the amount of their increased policy payment but also by the amount of this transfer,
hence lowering their total contributions while leaving their public goods consumption
una®ected. As a result, these individuals can raise their private consumption, and they
increase their utilities because naturally, non-contributors cannot reduce their private
supplements. It is then not surprising that the median voter will want to extend g at
least to the level where she ceases to contribute subsequently.
24We have shown that the median voter m and all lower-preference individuals do not
make a private contribution. What about higher-preference individuals? Similar to
the model with private ex-ante contributions, a subset of highest-preference individuals
may want to enhance their public goods consumption. The Proposition below compares
the ex-post regime and the ex-ante regime with respect to private contributions and
equilibrium policies gep
m and gea
m, respectively. To simplify the exposition, we focus on
a situation where the set of contributors in both scenarios is non-empty.26
Proposition 8. With ex-post contributions, the equilibrium policy is strictly smaller
than in the model with ex-ante contributions, gep
m < gea
m . Moreover,
a) each non-contributor (including all individuals j · m) prefers the ex-post regime
over the ex-ante regime (and over the public regime); this is true even though
their public goods consumption in the former regime may be lower.
b) Private contributions in the ex-post regime are strictly larger, and the set of con-
tributors may be larger. Contributors strictly prefer the ex-ante over the ex-post
regime, while the comparison between ex post regime and public regime is ambigu-
ous.
Proof: see the Appendix.
Equilibrium policies in all three regimes are ranked as gep
m · gea
m · gpp, with strict
inequalities unless no agent privately contributes. The intuitive reason for this result
is again due to a commitment e®ect: by adopting a smaller policy in the ex-post
regime, the median voter can induce high-preference individuals to raise their private
contributions. Clearly, all low-preference agents (including all agents j · m) welcome
this commitment device.27 While this means that a majority of individuals prefers
26If this set is empty in the ex-post regime, it will be empty in the ex-ante regime as well. Without
private contributors, equilibrium policies can be identical, and private goods consumption can be
larger in the ex-ante setting. See the example below.
27This is due to revealed preferences: the median voter could always choose the same policy than in
the ex-ante setting, and raise his utility (and the utilities of all lower-preference agents) because private
contributions go up in the ex-post setting. Intuitively, while these contributions are best responses to
a given policy in the ex-post setting, they are smaller than the best responses to the same policy level
in the ex-ante setting.
25the ex-post setting over both alternative regimes, a minority of high-preference agents
dislikes the ex-post setting, because low-preference individuals now provide less input
into the public good than before. In fact, for these individuals, even the pure public
setting may be preferred to the ex-post regime. With regard to the total public goods
consumption in each institutional setting, results are generally ambiguous. One can
show that, for a pure public good, public goods consumption coincides in the ex-post
regime and under public provision- and exceeds consumption in the ex-ante regime -
when preferences do not exhibit income e®ects; otherwise, public good consumption in
the ex-ante regime can be more substantial.28
6 `Almost' Private and Pure Public Goods
At this point, it is useful to brie°y examine the polar cases of a pure private, and
a pure public good. Let us start investigating an `almost' private good G for which
externalities disappear in the limit, ¯ ! 0.29 In both dual-provision and the pure public
regime, the equilibrium policy is then the same. The reason for this result is simple.
First, and as we have seen above, the median voter herself will never make a private
contribution. Second, because externalities `almost' disappear, there exists no strategic
voting motive for the median individual or anybody else in society. Regardless of the
regime, the median voter m will then select her policy in a way that ¢m(cm;Gm) = 1.
Accordingly, individuals j · m make no private contribution in the hybrid regimes,
while each individual i > m contributes to satisfy ¢i(ci;Gi) = 1. Regardless of the
regime under consideration, agents with preferences lower than the median voter are
forced into an excessive consumption of the public good. In fact, all these individuals
su®er from the public provision of G, as compared to the alternative of a `market
28Suppose ¯ = 1. In absence of income e®ects, and as long as some individuals make a private
contribution, total consumption is higher in the ex-post setting than in the ex-ante setting: the public
goods consumption of the highest-preference individual h is characterized by ¢h(¢) = 1 in the ex-post
setting, but by ¢h(¢) > 1 in the ex-ante setting. Conversely, in presence of income e®ects, public
goods consumption can be larger in the ex-ante regime. This regime features a larger equilibrium
policy, thus boosting the marginal utilities of private contributors.
29For ¯ = 0, we have shown above that multiple equilibria exist, making comparisons useless.
26system' in which each individual would be allowed to freely decide on its consumption
level. Conversely, and as we have already established for the case ¯ = 0 in Section
3 above, all higher-preference individuals including m are indi®erent between the two
hybrid systems and the market system, and strictly prefer them over the public regime:
voluntary contributions allow those individuals to expand their consumption beyond
the publicly provided level, and to achieve the same utility as in a private setting.
In contrast, the choice of the dual institution matters in presence of externalities. To
highlight the economic di®erences between the ex-ante and the ex-post regime, consider
the polar case of a pure public good, ¯ = 1. Standard results (Bergstrom et al., 1986)
suggest that in absence of income e®ects, only the highest-preference individual will
privately contribute. As we show now, his private contributions can be very large in an
ex-post regime, while under otherwise identical circumstances they can be even zero in
the ex-ante regime.
Consider quasi-linear preferences, Ui = ci +®iH(Gi), where ®i is a preferences param-
eter and H(¢) some increasing and concave function. Under pure public provision, the
equilibrium policy gpp
m > 0 yields a public goods consumption Gpp implicitly given by
H0(Gpp) = 1=N®m, where N represents the number of agents and ®m the median indi-
vidual's taste parameter. Now suppose that N®m is `su±ciently close' to the preference
parameter of the highest-preference agent, ®h.30
In the ex-post regime, the equilibrium policy gep is then zero. This is because in absence
of public provision, only h will subsequently contribute in the quasi-linear setting, and
he will do so in a way that H0(Gep) = 1=®h. This generates a public goods provision
similar (or even identical) to Gpp at no cost to any other agent: the capability to
commit to a policy makes it optimal for m (and a majority of citizens) to free ride
on h's contributions. For comparison, consider now the ex-ante setting. Here, h is
aware that his private contributions will crowd out public provision. When N®m is
again close to ®h, his optimal reaction is to forego any private contribution, inducing
a public policy gpp
m and associated public goods consumption Gpp in the second stage.
For obvious reasons, a large majority of individuals is made worse o® compared to
30For example, let N = 3, ®1 = 1;®2 = ®m = 2, and ®3 = ®h = 6.
27the ex-ante system, and all those individuals achieve the same utility than under pure
public provision.31 Overall, these arguments show that while public good consumption
levels may be very similar or even identical in both dual regimes, those regimes can
display extreme di®erences regarding the amount of private contributions, equilibrium
policies, and the overall utility distribution when externalities are signi¯cant.
7 Endogenous Timing of Contributions
How do these previous results ¯t into a general framework, where both ex-ante and
ex-post private contributions are feasible, and can be freely chosen by each individual?
At ¯rst glance, one may think that the outcome must coincide with the results for the
ex-post system. Since public decisions still precede private contributions, adding an
ex-ante contributions stage seems strategically irrelevant at ¯rst. Perhaps surprisingly,
though, we will show that this intuition is incorrect. In fact, endogenizing the timing of
private contribution will often strictly raise the wellbeing of a majority, or even bene¯t
all members in society.
A full analysis of the general scenario is beyond the scope of our paper. However,
central ¯ndings can already be obtained in a restricted setting. Speci¯cally, we provide
a characterization for the case of quasilinear preferences, and the special case where
the number of agents is N = 3. Consider preferences of the form Ui = ci + ®i lnGi
with ®i increasing in i. Then, ci = yi ¡ g ¡ ~ gi ¡ ^ gi is the private consumption of
individual i with income yi, who contributes g to the public good in the political
process, makes a voluntary contribution of ^ gi in an ex-ante stage, and another ex-
post contribution ~ gi after the policy g has been implemented. Accordingly, Gi =
gz + (~ gi + ^ gi) + ¯
P
j6=i(~ gj + ^ gj) is i's consumption level of public services.
To start the exploration, notice ¯rst that by extension of our previous results, only
31For completeness, suppose N®m and ®h are not of similar size. Then, results in both dual regimes
coincide. For N®m su±ciently smaller than ®h, the equilibrium policy is zero and h's equilibrium
contribution yields a public goods consumption given by H0(G) = 1=®H, which is larger than in the
public provision regime. Conversely, for N®m su±ciently larger than ®h, h does not contribute and
m implements a policy gpp.
28individual i = 3 may in equilibrium provide voluntary contributions ~ gi and ^ gi, re-
spectively. To see this, note that after the policy stage, only the (now endogenous)
individual with highest preferences will possibly contribute in stage 3. This individual
is individual i = 3 unless this agent made a rank-reversing contribution in stage 1.
But for the same reasons as in the partial setting with ex-ante contributions, doing so
can never be optimal: agent 3 can never bene¯t from an initial stage-1 contribution
for which his stage-2 preferences for public goods are less than those of the natural
median i = 2.32
Solving by backwards induction, we ¯rst study individual 3's ex-post contribution in




3 = arg max~ g3 U
3(^ g;g; ~ g3) = y3¡g¡^ g3¡~ g3+®3 ln (gz+~ g3+^ g3) = maxf®3¡gz¡^ g3;0g:
(4)
As expected, the optimal ex-post contribution (if positive) decreases in both g and ^ g3.
For subsequent reference, (??) reveals that from the perspective of agent 3, the timing
of private contributions is irrelevant as long as his stage-3 choice is interior (which in
turn depends on g).
Consider now the policy decision at stage 2. For given ¯rst-period contribution ^ g3, the
median individual 2 decides on g. Her goal is to maximize
U
2(g; ^ g3) = y2 ¡ g + ®2 ln[gz + ¯(^ g3 + ~ g
¤
3(g; ^ g3))]: (5)
Taking individual 3's response into account, the median voter's utility function is piece-
wise de¯ned. We ¯rst consider a range I where33
g · ¹ g(^ g3) ´ (®3 ¡ ^ g3)=z: (6)
For policies weakly smaller than the threshold ¹ g(¢), ~ g¤
3 is positive and the ¯rst-order
32In absence of a rank-reversing contribution decision, then, our earlier ¯ndings immediately apply:
only individuals with preferences larger than the median voter may possibly contribute in stage 1.
For more on this, see the subsequent discussion.
33Note that ¹ g(^ g3) is always non-negative because individual 3 will never invest more than ®3, no
matter how much the other individuals contribute.
29derivative of (??) reads
¡1 +
®2







3=dg = ¡z ensures concavity of (??), an interior solution is obtained when
(??) assumes a positive value at g = 0, and a negative value at ¹ g. For an interior
solution, the (local) policy optimum then is (using ^ g3 + ~ g3 = ®3 ¡ gz from (??)),
g




Of course, this policy (if positive) is exactly the equilibrium policy in the ex-post
system. For the range of policies g where ~ g3 is interior, the median voter's preferred
policy is independent of ^ g3, for obvious reasons: agent 2 knows that agent 3's total
contributions ^ g3 + ~ g3 remain the same no matter how large his initial contribution is.




+g; ¹ g(^ g3)g: (9)
Next, consider range II which comprises the complementary interval of policies, g(^ g3) >
¹ g(^ g3). Now, d~ g¤
3=dg = 0 and the ¯rst-order condition of (??) reads
¡1 +
®2z
gz + ¯^ g3
· 0: (10)
An interior solution yields,
g








++(^ g3); ¹ g(^ g3);0g: (12)
For future reference, note that g++ ¸ g+ always holds (with strict inequality for g++ >
0) because again, ^ g3 · ®3 must be satis¯ed.34 Collecting, we obtain the following
preliminary results. Consider a given ^ g3, as chosen by individual 3 in stage 1. Then, the
34Note that agent 3 will never invest more than ®3: this is not only his maximum contribution in
any private-contributions game, but investing more would also reduce the continuation policy which
cannot be in 3's interest.
30median voter's local policy optima are g¤
I for policy choices from the interval g ·
¹ g = (®3 ¡ ^ g3)=z, and g¤
II for the complementary interval g > ¹ g in which no additional
ex-post contributions are made.
To identify global optima, suppose ¯rst agent 3's ex-ante contribution is at its maximum
level, ^ g3 = ®3. For this initial contribution, the threshold investment ¹ g(¢) is zero.
Accordingly, range I collapses into the point g = 0 and by continuity of U2(¢), the
median voter adopts a policy g¤
II = maxf0;g++g in stage 2. Two cases are to be
distinguished. First, imagine that g++(®3) · 0, which arises i®
z®2 · ¯®3: (C1)
We show that if (C1) applies, ¹ g(^ g3) ¸ g++(^ g3) for any arbitrary ^ g3 · ®3. We also show
that as a consequence, the median voter's global optimum is g¤
I, and equilibrium results
coincide with those in the ex-post contributions regime. To establish the ¯rst statement,
notice that ¡d¹ g=d^ g3 ¸ ¡dg++=d^ g3. Hence, ¹ g(®3) = 0 ¸ g++(®3) immediately implies
¹ 0 < g(^ g3) ¸ g++(^ g3) for any ^ g3 < ®3. Range II thus features the boundary solution
g¤
II = ¹ g(¢), and continuity of U2(¢) in g ensures that g¤
I (which is either interior or
zero) must be the equilibrium policy as chosen in majority voting. By de¯nition of
range I, agent 3 will then make an ex-post contribution ~ g3 for which his total voluntary
contributions equal those in the ex-post governance system.
Conversely, consider a situation in which the preferences of agents 2 and 3 are su±-
ciently close to each other that (C1) does not apply. Then, 0 < g++(®3) > ¹ g(®3) and
g++(^ g3) > ¹ g(^ g3) is satis¯ed for some non-empty set of contributions ^ g3 < ®3. We claim
that agent 3 will in this situation choose some positive ex-ante investment level ^ g¤
3
which is followed by an equilibrium policy g¤
II = g++, and zero ex-post contributions.
To verify this, start again from an initial contribution ^ g3 = ®3 for which necessarily,
¹ g = 0 and g
++
3 > 0. Note that for this contribution level, the stage-2 policy choice of
agent 2 is g¤
II = g++. Reducing ^ g3 below ®3, the policy g++ increases in response. At
the same time, reducing ^ g3 increases ¹ g which (provided g+ is positive), at some point
reaches g+.35 Again, the local boundary solution g¤
I = ¹ g prevails in range I and by
continuity of U2(¢), g++ (> g+) will be the globally optimal policy reaction. Lowering
35Of course, this contribution range does not exist if g+ = 0. Also, notice that if g+ is positive,
31^ g3 further, the median voter utility function now displays the two interior local optima
g¤
I = g+, and g¤
II = g++. At least for contribution levels where ¹ g remains `su±ciently
close' to g+, g++ remains globally optimal.36 But for some small ^ g3 where ¹ g(^ g3) ap-
proaches g++, g+ becomes the global optimum. Denote the largest contribution level
that triggers a switch in optima from g++ to g+ as ^ g¤
3. At ^ g3 = ^ g¤
3, the subsequent
equilibrium policy g exhibits a discontinuous downwards jump, necessarily reducing
utility for agent 3. Recalling that for any ^ g3 < ^ g¤
3, agent 3's total contributions and
his utility level (which is identical to the ex-post setting) remain unchanged, we can
conclude that ^ g¤
3 constitutes a lower bound on agent 3's equilibrium contributions. The
stage-2 equilibrium policy is thus g++, and agent 3 does not provide any ex-post con-
tribution. Finally, notice that by revealed preference agent 3 must be strictly better o®
than in the system with ex-post contributions; this is because he always has the option
of investing nothing in the ¯rst period, thereby replicating his utility in the ex-post
system.
The following ¯gure illustrates these ¯ndings.
| Figure about here |
Our previous discussion allows us to state the following result.
Proposition 9. Consider quasilinear preferences and N = 3. If z®2 · ¯®3, total
voluntary contributions ^ g3 + ~ g3, equilibrium policies, and overall economic outcome in
the general system are identical to those in a system with only ex-post contributions.
Conversely, if z®2 > ¯®3, agent 3's ex-ante contribution ^ g3 is positive and larger than
in the ex-post setting, but his ex-post contribution is zero. Individual m = 2 is the
median voter and implements a policy ggs




1) Agent 2 and Agent 3 prefer the general system over the ex-post system (Agent 1's
¹ g can `reach' g+ only if g+ < ¹ g(^ g3 = 0). Even if one of these properties are not satis¯ed, all of our
subsequent arguments remain valid.
36This is because at a contribution level where ¹ g(^ g3) = g¤
I, and since g++ > g¤
I, U2(¢) must necessarily
be increasing at g = g¤
I.
32preference is ambiguous).
2) Agents 1 and 2 prefer the general system over the ex-ante system, and over the
pure public system. Agent 3 is worse o® compared to the ex-ante system, while
his preference ranking with respect to the pure public system is ambiguous.
Proof: Most of these results have been established before. In what follows, assume that
(C1) does not apply. To show that agent 3 prefers the general system over the ex-post
system, note that he could always choose ^ g3 = 0, thus replicating results from the
latter regime. When choosing ^ g3 > 0, his utility must be higher by revealed preference.
Next, the equilibrium policy ggs
m in the general setting must satisfy ggs
m > gep
m. If not,
agent 3 would clearly prefer the ex-post system, because his private contribution ~ g
ep
3
is positive and a best response to gep
m in this regime. To show that agent 2 prefers the
general system, note that she could always implement policy gep
m in stage 2. Under this
policy, agent 3's total private contributions ~ g3 + ^ g3, by (3) exceed those in the ex-post
system. Hence, agent 2 must prefer the general system by revealed preference.37
Finally, let us show that agents 1 and 2 prefer the general system over the ex ante
system, while agent 3 has reverse preferences. This ranking is immediate for agent 2,
given that the ex-post system dominates the ex-ante system according to her prefer-
ences (refer Proposition 7). To see that agent 1 also prefers the general system, note
that in the general system and in the ex-ante system, equilibrium policies are best re-
sponses to ^ g3. But since ^ g
gs
3 > ^ g
ep
3 > ^ gea
3 , we must have gea
m < ggs
m which is preferred by
agent 1 who as smaller policy preferences than the median agent. Conversely, agent 3
must prefer the ex ante system. While the actual equilibrium policy is best response to
^ g3 in both regimes, the general system requires agent 3 to operate under an additional
constraint in stage 1, which leads to larger then optimal initial contributions from his
point of view. 2
Our results show that, for a wide range of parameter constellations, ex-post system
and general system are not economically identical. In fact, the high-preference agent
37For agent 1, though, the comparison is ambiguous: while agent 1 appreciates the larger private
contributions made by agent 3, he dislikes the fact that the implemented policy may be larger than
the one in the ex-post system.
33may strictly prefer the general system for the following reason. By exerting a suf-
¯ciently large contribution ex ante, this agent generates a commitment not to make
any additional private investment ex post. In contrast to the ex-post system, this
deprives the median voter of her incentive to implement an arti¯cially low policy, to
lure the high-preference agent into making additional ex-post contributions. A simple
argument also shows that if agent 3 takes advantage of this commitment device, the
equilibrium policy ggs
m in the general setting is always larger than in the setting with
ex-post contributions. This follows from revealed preference: the high-preference agent
can always replicate the outcome of the ex-post system, by providing no contribution
in the ¯rst stage. Hence, investing ex ante (but not ex post) can be optimal only if the
median voter's implemented policy exceeds the level in the ex-post system.
Importantly, not only the high-preference agent but also the median voter prefers the
general system. The reason again relies on revealed preference: irrespective of agent
3's contribution in the ¯rst stage, the median voter cannot be made worse o® compared
to the ex-post system. After all, she can always replicate policy gep
m, inducing agent
3 to make a total private contribution at least as large as in the ex-post system. But
this means that whenever agent 2 chooses another policy, it must make her better o®.
Overall, the general system is thus characterized by a larger equilibrium policy (to make
agent 3 better o®), and by larger private contributions (to make median agent 2 better
o®). Quite strikingly, the possibility to contribute ex ante, combined with the median
voter's ability to punish initial contributions that she perceives as too small, allows
(at least) a majority of the population to raise their utilities.38 In particular, private
contributions do not trigger the standard `crowding out e®ect'; rather, a `crowding in'
arises in that initial private contributions boost public policies.
A comparison to the ex-ante system is simple but interesting. Clearly, private contri-
butions in the general setting will again be larger. But this means that the equilibrium
policy in the endogenous setting must be smaller, recalling that policy choice in both
general and ex-ante setting are best responses to the stage-1 contributions. The welfare
38Agent 1 may or may not prefer the general system: while he appreciates the larger contribution
by agent 3 in the latter system, he dislikes the higher policy level.
34comparison is now immediate. While all non-contributors prefer the general system
over the ex-ante regime, the high-preference agent has the opposite ranking. From
agent 3's point of view, his contribution is excessive and only made as a commitment
device not to contribute ex post. Conversely, all other agents welcome this overinvest-
ment.
Overall, our results suggest that equilibrium outcomes in the general system originate
from a complex strategic interaction of both relevant players, the median voter and
the high-preference individual. For the high-preference individual, allowing additional
ex-ante contributions reduces the overall hold-up power of the majority, and makes him
better o®. Conversely, for the median voter, the general setting represents the best of
all worlds: private contributions are large, while her equilibrium policy does not need
to incorporate a downwards bias for incentive reasons.
Finally, our ¯ndings allow us to make a strong policy statement. Consider a scenario
where citizens can choose the institutional structure by majority vote. Among all the
systems that we analyzed, the regime with endogenous timing emerges as the Condorcet
winner: it is majority preferred over the pure public system (at least by agents 1 and
2), over the ex-ante system (by agents 1 and 2), and over the ex-post system (at least
by agents 2 and 3).
8 Switching from a Private Provision Regime
Our previous analysis explored a transition for pure public provision to one of various
dual public-private systems. In many situations of empirical importance, though, the
status quo institution is not one with public provision, but one where individuals pri-
vately provide those services. For example, large parts of the health care system are
privately organized in many countries, some municipalities do not ¯nance public trans-
portation, and there are many areas of decentralized policymaking within federations.
When analyzing a market(or `purely private') system, we should ¯rst note that the
equilibrium in private contributions is identical to the continuation equilibrium in our
35previous ex-post setting, for a stage-1 policy g = 0. In this purely private system, some
subset of individuals with highest preferences invests. Their contributions are given by
the system of ¯rst-order conditions ¢i(ci;Gi) · 1, which hold with equality for any
contributor. When externalities are su±ciently large, all lower-preference individuals
then completely free ride on this private supply of public goods. As this argument sug-
gests, non-contributing individuals may not support a switch from a private-provision
regime to any system involving public provision. On the other hand, however, for some
agents public provision is a device to alleviate or even mitigate the underprovision of
public services that characterizes a private system.
The following Proposition addresses these questions.
Proposition 10. Consider the transition from a private system to a dual public-
private regime. Then,
1) regardless of ¯, adopting the dual ex-post regime is preferred by a majority of
the population (strictly so if m chooses a positive policy), including any i ¸ m.
Conversely, a subset of lower-preference individuals may oppose.
2) adopting an ex-ante system may be opposed by a majority of individuals, including
all low-preference individuals j · m.
Proof: To establish part 1), notice that for a policy g = 0, the outcome is identical to
the outcome in the private system. If the pivotal median voter m implements gep > 0,
she must be better o® by revealed preference. In addition, every individual i > m
prefers gep over any smaller policy (Lemma 5), which validates the result. Finally,
notice that for ¯ ! 0 where gep = gpp, each individual j < m (and thus, a strong
minority of citizens) opposes the regime change from private to ex-post system. To
establish part 2), reconsider the quasilinear example analyzed in Section 6. If G is a
pure public good, standard results suggest that only the highest-preference h individual
will contribute to its provision in a decentralized setting, while all other individuals
free ride. In the ex-ante system, the highest-preference agent h may not privately
contribute, but rely on the public provision of G instead. As we have shown, h will
always adopt this strategy if ®mN and ®h are close to each other, and m in response
36implements a public provision level almost identical to the private provision setting.
Both regimes are then characterized by a similar level of public goods consumption;
however, the funding is provided entirely by h in the private regime, and uniformly by
all society members in the ex-ante regime. Clearly, this makes everybody (other than
h) worse o® in the ex-ante regime. 2
When private provision represents the status quo, adopting a dual system does not ¯nd
unanimous consent. A possibly surprising feature here is that it is the low-preference
(or poor) individuals who often prefer a private system over one which ensures public
provision. This ¯nding is basically a consequence of two related arguments. The
median voter's policy decision forces each individual with smaller preferences to pay
more towards public goods consumption than privately desired.39 In addition, and as
has already been said above, the pure private system allows individuals to free ride
on the contributions of high-preference individuals, in the extreme without providing
any private contribution at all.40 Both arguments push preferences of low-preference
individuals in the same direction: their loss on private consumption in a dual system
can be so severe that even a larger public goods consumption provides no su±cient
compensation.
Remarkably, we ¯nd that the ex-post system - and by extension of our previous results
the general system with endogenous timing - unambiguously dominates the private
market system for a majority of agents. The preferences of these agents are strict
(whenever gep > 0) for any arbitrary degree of externalities.41 The reason is simple,
39A similar point is made in Cremer and Palfrey (2000).
40This argument essentially extends to a setting with income taxes: even though low-preference
individuals may pay less taxes (if they are also the low-income individuals), their contribution is still
positive.
41We have shown above that for ¯ = 0, a majority of agents is indi®erent. Slightly di®erent results
have been established in the literature for this case. In Cremer and Palfrey (2000), voters within
districts are heterogenous and by assumption, the federal policy decision is made by the federal
median individual. Then, a majority of voters in regions with median preferences below those of
the federal median agent su®er from a transition to the ex-post system, because they would prefer a
smaller provision level. Conversely, all other individuals and thus a majority of the overall population
strictly welcome the transition. Epple and Romano (1996) also show that the majority of voters
strictly prefers the dual system; all these voters bene¯t from the redistributive aspects of income
37and relies on revealed preferences. If the median voter chooses a policy g = 0, she
simply replicates the outcome in the private setting. Conversely, if she chooses g > 0,
and since all individuals i > m prefer even larger policies, all those individuals must
be better o®.
In contrast, the ex-ante system is not necessarily preferred by a majority. In fact, since
private contributions are made in the ¯rst stage prior to the policy decision, high-
preference individuals have an incentive to reduce their own voluntary contributions,
thus urging the median voter into a larger collective provision. This e®ect can lead a
large majority to favor the private system over the ex-ante setting. Interestingly, there
is a stark contrast to the case where public provision represents the status quo regime,
where we found that adopting the ex-ante system is even preferred with unanimity.
Overall, our ¯ndings show that irrespective of the size of externalities, moving from
a purely private regime to a dual system of provision is always majority preferred, as
long as the system admits private ex-post contributions. This outcome is especially
encouraging because, on the other hand, moving from a private system to a purely
public system will often be rejected by a majority of the population. Adopting a
dual institution thus relaxes political feasibility constraints, and it can also serve as a
response to distributional concerns in society.
9 Conclusions
This paper o®ers an analysis of political decisionmaking in a framework where indi-
viduals can privately enhance their consumption of an impure public good, that is
democratically provided by political choice. We explore di®erent scenarios in which in-
dividuals can make their private provisions in a non-cooperative fashion, before and/or
after the political outcome is decided by majority vote. Notwithstanding the relative
complexity of the model a variety of strong and interesting results can be established.
First and foremost, we ¯nd that while the feasibility of private contributions in presence
of externalities may cause a break down of preference single peakedness, the outcome
taxation in their setting.
38of the median voter theorem still applies: in equilibrium, the median voter's preferred
provision level beats any other policy alternative in pairwise comparison. Relatedly,
irrespective of the assumed timing, private contributions are never rank-reversing in
the sense that some individual other than the `natural' median (the median individual
in a pure public setting) might become the political decisionmaker in equilibrium. We
then use these insights to explore the characteristics of equilibria, and to provide a com-
parison of alternative regimes. When public goods are provided exclusively through
the political process in the status quo, moving to a system with additional ex-ante
contributions is bene¯cial for everybody in society. In contrast, unanimity is lost when
moving to a system which allows only ex-post contributions; this latter regime is still
preferred by majority but will in general be opposed by some high-preference indi-
viduals. Interestingly, allowing for private ex-post and ex-ante contributions ¯nds the
support of the majority of individuals, no matter what the status quo is: a majority
of higher preference individuals prefer this endogenous timing regime over the ex-post
regime (and by extension, over pure public provision); conversely, a di®erent majority
including all low-preference individuals prefers it over the ex-ante regime. Implement-
ing this `general' system may even generate unanimous consent. These latter ¯ndings
are especially encouraging insofar that in many empirically relevant situations, indi-
viduals will likely have full discretion on the timing of their individual contributions.
The paper also quanti¯ed and compared equilibrium policies and the equilibrium level
of private contributions for each institutional setting.
Finally, we showed that if a completely decentralized (private-provision) regime is taken
as the status quo, the institutional comparisons change drastically. While moving to
the ex-post system (or a fortiori, the general system) is still preferred by a majority, a
strong supermajority may now oppose any transition to the ex-ante system. Overall,
our results suggest that when starting out from a pure public regime, there is always
unanimous support for an institutional change to a dual system. Overwhelming support
for a regime change is less likely when a private system represents the status quo.
However, when only a majority is required for a regime change, a dual public-private
system will be adopted regardless of the status in place; according to our preliminary
analysis, endogenous contributions then emerge as the stable equilibrium institution.
39Further research on these issues is clearly desirable to enhance our understanding of
the evolution of institutions in setting with both dual private and public provision.
40Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
To establish the monotonicity properties as stated i the Proposition, we consider the
private contributions equilibrium in stage 1. The utility-maximizing stage-1 contribu-
tion of an individual i is
^ g
¤















The set of contributors C must always include the highest-preference individuals. To













(1 + ¯(N ¡ 1))];
is strictly increasing in index i: ¯rst, dg=d^ gi is uniform across individuals, and second,
the marginal rate of substitution ¢i(¢) = Ui
G=Ui
c is increasing in i. Invoking normality,
it is then impossible to have dUl(^ g¡l; ^ gl = 0)=d^ gl · 0 and at the same time Uk(^ g¡k; ^ gk =
0)=d^ gk > 0 for any two individuals k;l with rank order l > k.42












dgi [1 + ¯(N ¡ 1)]
: (14)
This system of ¯rst-order conditions de¯nes the equilibrium contributions for any i 2
C. To analyze these conditions, note ¯rst that for any ¯ > 0, the marginal rate
of substitution is not unity because any increase in private contributions triggers a
smaller equilibrium public policy, dg(^ g)=d^ gi < 0. This feature is intuitive. With
normal preferences, larger private contributions of some i > m cause the median voter
m to raise her private consumption, with the consequence of a decrease in the public









(1 + ¯(N ¡ 1))];
is positive if evaluated at a contribution vector ^ g = 0.
41policy g. In anticipation of this negative response, each contributor provides a smaller
contribution than he would do otherwise. Speci¯cally, contributions are kept below the
level which equates (taken the subsequent public provision into account) marginal rate
of substitution and marginal costs of provision. Finally, inspection shows that because
of the symmetry property dg=^ dgi = dg=d^ gj for any two contributors i;j, equilibrium
contributions must be strictly increasing in the index of natural preferences.43 Hence,
public-goods consumption is increasing in the natural preference index, and strictly so
for the set of contributors and unless ¯ = 1. 2
Proof of Proposition 6
For any private contributor i, the second-stage ¯rst-order condition ¢i(gep
m; ~ g) = 1
holds, which equalizes his marginal utilities from consuming public and private goods.
In contrast, ¢j(gep
m; ~ g¡j; ~ gj = 0) < 1 for any non-contributor j. By standard arguments,
the set of contributors in stage 2 is decreasing in g and at certain threshold levels g,
the lowest-preference contributing individual becomes a non-contributor.
The proof proceeds in several steps. We consider the range of ¯rst-period policies gm for
which m contributes in the second stage, ~ gm(gm) > 0. We show that within this range
g 2 [g
m; ¹ gm], an increase in g raises the total contributions GT ´ Ngm +
P
i ~ gi of all
i 2 N individuals. As an implication of this result, the total contributions G¡m
m (g) of
individuals other than m are shown to increase in g as well. Since Um(gm) is increasing
if and only if dG¡m
m =dgm > 0 (see Lemmas 1 and 2 above), the median voter m cannot
be a stage-2 contributor in equilibrium. In other words, m's globally optimal policy gep
m
is (weakly) larger than ¹ gm, and therefore larger than any upper-boundary threshold ¹ gj
for individuals indexed j < m. This proves the result.
Step 1: dGT(gm)=dgm > 0 whenever the number of contributors is ^ N < N, and if
¯ < 1.
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose a raise in gm from g0
m to g00
m would lower
total contributions GT(gm) towards the public good. Then, there must be at least
43Suppose not, and the lower-preference individual j contributes more in equilibrium. Then, the
¯rst-order conditions () and () cannot simultaneously hold for individuals i and j.
42one individual k (necessarily, a contributor under policy g0
m) who reduces his total
contribution gT
k under policy g00
m. We show that this behavior would be inconsistent
with normality. To see this, suppose ¯rst that k's public goods consumption Gk is
smaller under policy g00
m. But since his private goods consumption must be larger under
policy g00
m than under policy g0
m, this would contradict normality. Second, suppose other
individuals compensate for the reduction in k's total contribution in a way which allows
k to (weakly) raise his public goods consumption Gk under policy g00
m. To see that this
is impossible, notice that for any unit reduction in gT
k , the total provision of all other
individuals, G
¡k
k , must increase by at least 1=¯ > 1 to avoid a reduction in Gk. But




Step 2: dGT(gm)=dgm > 0 implies dG¡m
m (gm)=dgm > 0.




m) = ¡² for g00
m > g0
m, where
² is a positive number. We show that m's stage-2 contributions are characterized by
~ gm(g00
m)¡~ gm(g0
m) < ¯². To see why, note that otherwise, m would raise her total public-
goods consumption in state g00
m relative to state g0
m. Her private consumption would
fall at the same time, which is inconsistent with the assumed normality of preferences.
Since dGT(gm)=dgm > 0, the di®erence in total public goods supply between both
states would satisfy G(g00
m) ¡ G(g0
m) · ¡(1 ¡ ¯)², which is negative for any ¯ < 1 and
a contradiction to the result in Step 1.
Step 3: dG¡m
m (gm)=dgm > 0 implies dUm(gm)=dgm > 0 for any gm < ¹ gm.
For any gm < ¹ gm, m contributes a positive amount in stage 2. In the considered
range gm 2 [g
m; ¹ gm], m can always raise gm in such a way that her total contribution
gT
m = gm + ~ gm constant. Since G¡m
m (gm) increases in gm, this strategy would leave m's
private consumption constant while raising her public goods consumption. Accordingly,
m always raises her utility by raising gm to a level gm ¸ ¹ gm where she does not voluntary
contribute in continuation equilibrium. Finally, since arg maxgm Um(gm) ¸ ¹ gm, neither
m nor any individual j < m contributes ~ gj > 0 in stage 2: this is because ¢m(gep
m; ~ gm =
0; ~ G¡m
m (gep
m)) · 1 implies ¢m(gep
m; ~ gj = 0; ~ G
¡j
j (gep
m)) < 1 by normality of preferences. 2
43Proof of Proposition 7
For a given policy level gm, private contributions are larger in the ex-post regime. To
see this, notice that for each contributor i, the second stage optimality condition reads
¢i(ci;Gi) = 1 , as compared to the optimality condition ¢i(ci;Gi) > 1 that prevails
in the ex-ante setting for commitment reasons. If in addition the equilibrium policies
are characterized by gep
m · gea (this will be established below), the respective Nash
equilibria unambiguously satisfy ~ gi > ^ gi for each contributor i.
In what follows, we show that the equilibrium policy level in the ex-post regime is
indeed smaller. To see this, note that in the alternative ex-ante setting, m's optimal
policy choice satis¯es the ¯rst-order condition ¢m(cm;Gm) = 1=z. In the ex-post













By our previous arguments (See Step 2 in the Proof of Proposition 5), this implies
¢m(cm;Gm) > 1=z whenever the set of contributors is nonempty. By way of contra-
diction, suppose now that gep
m ¸ gea, i.e., the equilibrium policy in the ex-post setting
is (weakly) larger. Since the median voter m does not privately contribute in either
regime, her private consumption in the ex-post regime is then (weakly) smaller. But
in order to satisfy the respective ¯rst-order conditions for equilibrium policy choice in
each regime, m's public goods consumption Gm in the ex-post regime would have to be
smaller as well. As a consequence, her utility in this regime would be smaller, which
is impossible: by our above results, implementing a policy gea
m would raise m's public-
goods consumption relative to the ex-ante regime (for any gm, private contributions




By revealed preference, our previous arguments imply that any non-contributor is bet-
ter o® in the ex-post regime: the median voter could have chosen the same policy
in each regime, rendering private consumption for non-contributors in both regimes
identical. At the same time, public consumption in the ex-post setting had been larger
44because of the higher level of private contributions (see above).44
Conversely, contributors i are worse o® in the ex-post system: since the equilibrium
policy is lower, achieving the same consumption Gi requires each of these these indi-
viduals to raise their total contributions in the ex-post regime. A contributor in the
ex-post regime may do even worse compared to the pure public system: the equilibrium
policy in the ex-post system is smaller because ¯rst, private contributions reduce m's
preferred policy. Second, the equilibrium policy in the ex-post setting is even smaller
than the best response to private contributions for commitment reasons. Hence, non-
contributors contribute less towards a contributor's public-goods consumption than




m and since for commitment reasons, gep
m is smaller than the best response to the
vector of subsequent private contributions, a comparison of public good consumption in both regimes
is generally ambiguous. However, note that if ¯ = 1 and preferences are quasilinear, public goods
consumption in the ex-post regime will be larger.
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